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The United States Is Moving Further
From Fostering Multilateral Restraint Of
Conventional Arms Sales
Arms sales is the blind spot of our generation. Every gener-
ation has its own blind spot which is incomprehensible to future
generations - slave trade of the eighteenth century and
childworkers of the nineteenth century. Like the other evils, this
too shall pass.1
I. Introduction
Not by itself, it will not pass. History has shown that leadership,
by a particular nation and with concerted diplomatic effort, has been
a principal ingredient leading to positive results from multilateral
conventional arms2 transfer restraint efforts.3 In the last thirty years,
arms transfer has become a national security and diplomatic instru-
ment of the major powers," as the quantity of arms transferred5 and
level of their technological sophistication has increased. 6 As a result,
arms transfer has become a major factor in East-West competition,7
and armed conflicts have become more devastating. 8 The past thirty
years has also been marked by unilateral9 and multilateral1" at-
tempts to both reduce the negative results of international arms
1. A. PIERRE, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES 311 (1982) [hereinafter A.
PIERRE]. This is a paraphrase of A. Pierre's quote of Anthony Sampson, noted British journal-
ist, in Arms Sales: Blind Spot of a Generation, The Observer (June 18, 1978). The last sen-
tence of this paraphrase, stating that "this too shall pass" is inferred by the quoted sentence,
according to A. Pierre.
2. The scope of this Comment is restricted to "conventional arms," meaning other than
nuclear. "Arms," as used in this Comment is not restricted to individual weapons, but means
all weapons and equipment of conventional war, to include individual and crew-served weap-
ons, weapons systems, aircraft, armored and other ground vehicles, boats and ships, communi-
cations equipment, and other equipment (writer's definition).
3. See generally infra p. 359 (discussion of Soviet First Party Secretary Khrushchev's
proposal for United Nations arms embargo of the Middle East), p. 360 (discussion of the
Carter administration's Conventional Arms Transfer Talks with the Soviet Union), p. 365
(discussion of the Venezuelan president's efforts to reactivate the Ayacucho Declaration).
4. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra p. 345.
6. See infra pp. 345-46.
7. See infra p. 346.
8. See infra p. 370.
9. See generally infra pp. 356-65.
10. Id.
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transfer and reverse the current trends." Until the present decade,
the United States had taken the initiative in many of these instances
to encourage restraint. 2 Presently, international arms transfer re-
straint does not appear to be a significant item in the United States
foreign policy agenda.'
In the past, cooperation among major arms suppliers was only
successful to a limited degree, in achieving restraint, when the objec-
tives were limited to a particular region of the world and toward
correcting a particular crisis. 4 Conventional wisdom at the begin-
ning of the Carter administration was that the Soviet Union was not
interested in multilateral arms transfer restraint; however, this
changed when, at Carter administration initiative, the United States
and the Soviet Union conducted Conventional Arms Transfer Talks,
which lasted for one year.' 5 The Reagan administration has taken a
different tack, concluding that cooperation among major suppliers is
presently an unworkable approach. One reason for the Reagan ad-
ministration's conclusion is that the Soviet Union, whose participa-
tion would be necessary for success, is no longer interested.' 6 Thus,
the present United States policy is to take no initiative toward en-
couraging arms supplier multilateral restraint, but to focus on re-
gional conflict resolution in an attempt to reduce underlying arms
demand motivation. 7 The present policy also supports United Na-
tions' ongoing arms transfer restraint efforts.' 8
This Comment describes world arms sales trends and the roles
of the arms suppliers. It traces the United States arms sales policies
and practices from World War II to the present. This Comment out-
lines past international efforts at restraint that illustrate how previ-
ous successes have been achieved. Last, this Comment examines the
present United States policy, concluding that the policy is too pas-
sive, lacks implementation, and lacks diplomatic leadership needed
for success.
II. Trends in World Arms Trade
Several marked international trends have occurred in the 1970's
and 1980's. 19 The trends are that arms sales have become a key dip-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally infra pp. 372-74.
14. See generally infra pp. 358-64.
15. See infra text accompanying note 183.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 303 and 304.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 308-10.
18. Id.
19. Most scholars of international arms transfer would likely agree that an excellent
discussion of trends is at A. PIERRE, supra note I. See also Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Wntr 1981-82), reprinted in NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, INTERNA-
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lomatic tool of supplier states, quality and quantity of transferred
arms have increased, significant flow is toward the Third World
rather than solely toward major alliance allies, indigenous arma-
ments industries within the Third World have become prominent,
and arms sales have become a major factor in East-West competi-
tion in the Third World. Each of these trends is discussed below.
The first rend is that arms sales have become a key diplomatic
tool of suppliers. 20 The major powers are placing less reliance on the
traditional instruments of reassurance and diplomacy, such as formal
alliances, stationing forces abroad, and threat of direct interven-
tion.21 Instead, nations are more likely to shore up allies or proxies
with arms than to commit their own forces. 22 Both the United States
and the Soviet Union now give less economic assistance than they
give military assistance.23
The second trend is that the quantity of weapons traded has
increased.24 Worldwide arms imports rose from 22.9 billion dollars
in 1975 to approximately 40 billion dollars each year from 1981 to
1984.25 In 1984, the United States share of total world arms exports
was 24.6 percent, and the Soviet Union's share was 26.8 percent.2
French and British sales volume have quadrupled since 1970.27 A
number of smaller suppliers have significantly increased their sales.28
The third trend is the qualitative upgrading of arms trans-
TIONAL ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 208-26 (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY].
20. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 211. Although not the most evi-
dent trend, this is the most disheartening trend with regard to prospects for multilateral
restraint.
21. Id.
22. Id. These trends, breaking away from the traditional diplomatic tools and instead
using arms supply, portend an environment that is more unfriendly to multilateral reduction
agreement. This Comment traces the change, from major power reliance in prior decades on
regional alliance and diplomacy, to supplying arms in this decade in order to achieve interna-
tional objectives. As major powers find that arms supply is more effective and economical than
traditional methods, it seems that major powers will emphasize arms supply. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 209.
25. Measured.in constant 1983 dollars. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFER, 6 (1986) [hereinafter WMEAT].
This document has been published annually by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA). ACDA distributes the report to major college, university, and public libraries.
Transfers dropped to 27 billion dollars in 1985, due principally to a decline of developing
country imports by over 40 percent in real terms for the previous year. Id. at 7. The 1986
WMEAT report concludes that the sharp decline was due to a burgeoning rise in developing
countries' imports in the early 1980's, which could not be sustained because of the economic
drain on those countries. Id. The 1986 WMEAT report states that years 1979-1984 can be
seen as a plateau period with a moderate growth rate of 1.5 percent, and that the 1985 drop
will probably be revised upward in future editions. The WMEAT report cautions against as-
suming a downward trend. Id.
26. WMEAT, supra note 25, at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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ferred.2 9 Prior to 1970, most arms transferred were the major pow-
ers' surplus and obsolete weapons.30 Today the weapons transferred
are among the most sophisticated the suppliers can offer."'
The fourth trend is that the direction of arms flow has
changed."2 Until the mid-1960's most weapons went to developed
countries, namely NATO and Warsaw Pact allies."3 This changed
during the Vietnam War period when the major portion of transfers
went to the developing world.3" The trend did not reverse with the
end of the war. During the late 1970's, shipments from the United
States to the Persian Gulf and Middle East quadrupled.3 5 Most So-
viet weapons are now shipped to Syria, Iraq, and Libya." By 1980,
this region was receiving fifty percent of all weapons shipped to the
Third World.37 In 1985, more than three-fourths of arms transfer
went to the Third World."
The fifth trend is toward the establishment of indigenous arma-
ment industries within the Third World.' Some twenty-four devel-
oping countries now produce weapons, whereas in 1960 hardly any of
these nations manufactured arms."' This trend is motivated by the
desire to reduce dependence for national security, rather than for
commercial reasons.4
Last, arms sales have become a major factor in East-West com-
petition in the Third World. 42 Arms transfer is the major tool for the
Soviets, and is an important tool for the United States, in gaining
allegiance of Third World countries.' 3
Several of these trends are disheartening with respect to pros-
pects for multilateral arms transfer restraint. Willingness to negoti-
ate arms transfer may be expected to decrease as major powers place
29. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 209.
30. id.
31. As late as the early 1960's, the aircraft transferred by the United States and the
Soviet Union were ten-year-old F-86's and MiG-17's, rather than the first-line fighters of the
period such as the F-4's and Mig-21's. In contrast, today the most technologically advanced
fighters are being transferred - F-15's and MiG-23's. Id.
32. Id. at 209-10.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 210.
37. id.
38. Id. See also WMEAT, supra note 25, at 6.
39. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 210.
40. Id. The major Third World arms suppliers are Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, In-
dia, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Yugoslavia. WMEAT, supra
note 25, at 26.
41. Id. States that have been motivated by perceived unreliability of outside suppliers
are Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and India. Nations that have built their own
defense industries, motivated less by perceptions of threat to security and more by political
status within their region, are Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Indonesia. Id.
42. Id. at 211.
43. id.
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less emphasis on diplomacy and more emphasis on arming their
proxies. Also, the major powers may be drifting further from poten-
tial cooperation on arms transfer since arms transfer has become a
major factor in East-West competition in the Third World.
III. Role of the Suppliers
The Soviet Union is the world's largest supplier of arms." Total
arms exports of the Soviet's major alliance - the Warsaw Pact - is
however less than that of the United States' major alliance -
NATO. The Warsaw Pact accounts for 34.1 percent of world arms
exports whereas NATO accounts for 48.6 percent of world arms ex-
ports.45 France, which is not a NATO member, is the world's third
largest supplier, with a 19.3 percent world market share in 1985.46
The Middle East is the dominant market for nearly all major
supplier countries4 7 with two exceptions. One exception is that
NATO is the main United States market.48 Another exception is
that the Soviet Union is the main market of the non-Warsaw Pact
group of suppliers. 49 The supplier roles in world arms transfer are
discussed in more detail following.
A. The United States Role in World Arms Transfer
The United States, long the world's largest supplier of arms,
transferred abroad over $120 billion in arms and military services,
during the period of 1950 to 1980.50 This was more than half the
world total during the period.5 1 During the late 1970's, the Soviet
Union overtook the United States as the world's leading arms sup-
plier.5 1 United States transfers are growing during the Reagan ad-
ministration, 3 with its military buildup 54 and emphasis on arms as
an instiument of diplomacy.
1. Early History.-Before World War II, the United States
44. WMEAT, supra note 25, at 10.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id. It may be surprising, but the Soviet Union is the world's eighth-ranked importer
of arms, even though the largest exporter in the world, and the primary supplier to five of the
top ten arms importing countries. Id.
50. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 217.
51. Id.
52. R. LABRIE, J. HUTCHINS, & E. PEURA, U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES, 23 (1982) [hereinafter R. LAaRIE] (citing U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 1970-1979 (1982)).
53. Id. at 16.
54. The "greatest peacetime arms buildup in United States history" occurred during the
Reagan administration. Gold, Caspar Weinberger's Legacy May Stand on 'Star Wars', 3 IN-
SIGHT 18 (Nov. 23, 1987).
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ranked behind France and Great Britain in arms exports.55 In 1939
the Neutrality Act 50 was amended to lift the prohibition of arms
sales to belligerents and permit the "cash and carry" policy that pre-
vailed during wartime.5 7 With the Lend-Lease program of 1941,5 8
the United States became the arms supplier to the allies.59 The Tru-
man Doctrine of 1947 became the cornerstone of United States con-
tainment policy toward the Soviet Union. The enactment of Public
Law 80-75 in 1947,60 providing military aid to Greece and Turkey,
marked the beginning of military assistance programs (MAP)."1
With the formation of NATO in 1949, an increasing number of
weapons were exported to European allies.6 2 The Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 19493 expanded aid to several countries outside
NATO. 4
As the containment policy expanded in the 1950's and early
1960's to geographic regions other than NATO regions, so did
United States military assistance.6 5 With the Korean War, Egypt's
turn to the Soviet Union for support, and involvement in Indochina
in the 1960's, United States foreign aid policy was broadened from
support for our allies to support for other nations as well. 6 When
55. Kemp & Miller, The Arms Trdnsfer Phenomenon, in ARMS TRANSFERS AND AMERI-
CAN FOREIGN POLICY, 21 (A. Pierre ed. 1979).
56. J. Res. Nov. 4, 1939, § 20, 54 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 441 et
seq.).
57. DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT, THE MANAGEMENT OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE 1-22 (1979) [hereinafter DEFENSE INSTITUTE].
58. Act of Mar. 11, 1941, ch. 1-11, 55 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §8
411-19 (1982) (these sections, comprising the Lend-Lease Act, expired by their own terms
following the end of World War 11. 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-19 (1982)). Lend-Lease was a program
submitted to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, designed to circumvent existing
neutrality legislation and make United States war materials immediately available to the Al-
lies. The Lend-Lease Act authorized the president to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, or lend
any defense articles to the government of any country whose defense the president deemed
vital to the defense of the United States, and made available to such nations the facilities of
United States shipyards. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 998-
99 (1965) [hereinafter S. MORISON].
59. In the terms of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "the arsenal of democracy." S.
MORISON, supra note 58, at 999. See also DEFENSE INSTITUTE, supra note 57, at 1-22.
60. Act of May 22, 1947, ch. 81, 61 Stat. 103-05 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1401-08, and
amended (1982)) (repealed 1954).
61. See generally DEFENSE INSTITUTE, supra note 57, at 1-25.
62. Lewis, Political Influence: The Diminished Capacity, in ARMS TRANSFERS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 188 (S. Newman & R. Harvey ed. 1979) [hereinafter Lewis].
63. Act of Oct. 6, 1949, ch. 1, 63 Stat. 714 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1571, and amended)
(repealed 1954).
64. Lewis, supra note 62. Military assistance during this period consisted primarily of
war surplus materials, free of charge to NATO allies and other countries seen as threatened
by communism, under what became known as the Military Assistance Program. AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, DEBATING THE DIRECTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 1979-1980 HIGH
SCHOOL DEBATE ANALYSIS 35 (1979).
65. Warnke, American Arms Transfers: Policy and Process in the Executive Branch, in
ARMS TRANSFERS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 195 (A. Pierre ed. 1979) [hereinafter
Warnke].
66. Id.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES
World War II surplus stockpiles diminished, United States security
assistance moved from military assistance program grants to arms
sales under foreign military sales programs.6 7
2. Nixon-Ford Years.-Concurrent with the beginning of the
"Vietnamization" of the Vietnam War6 8 Nixon established new
guidelines for United States security assistance policy. The guide-
lines stated that the United States would respect commitments and
help its friends, but would look to the nation directly threatened to
assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for
defense. 9
In the 1970's several trends in United States arms transfer oc-
curred." These trends included the continued decline in the use of
grant military aid, and the increase in the number of arms sales re-
cipients and commercial sales.7 '
In 1968, the Foreign Military Sales Act 2 was passed, requiring
administrations' arms sales policies to emphasize foreign policy.73
The dollar value of arms transactions was rising dramatically and
weapons sold by the United States were becoming increasingly so-
phisticated.74 These factors, and what was perceived as a casual atti-
tude on the part of executive branch policy makers, became major
concerns of Congress and the public in the 1970's.7 5
The Nixon and Ford administrations did not appear to follow a
coherent arms transfer policy.7 6 Arms sales became more a tool of
politics than an instrument of foreign policy. 7 For example, in 1972
President Nixon gave instructions to honor virtually all requests
from Iran, thereby circumventing the formal review process.71 Presi-
dent Ford decided during the 1976 presidential campaign to sell
Israel equipment that had previously been banned. 9 In response,
Congress enacted a law80 that gave it power over individual transac-
67. Id.
68. Nixon labeled as "Vietnamization" his move away from attempting to win the Viet-
nam war with U.S. forces, so that they could be withdrawn, and toward attempting to make
the Vietnamese forces capable of sustaining the effort (writer's explanation).
69. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. ARMS
TRANSFER POLICY 5 (unpublished report to the Subcomm. on International Security and Sci-
entific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives) (Sept. 25,
1981).
70. Warnke, supra note 65, at 198-99.
71. Id.
72. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2341).
73. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 48.
79. Id.
80. The Nelson amendment to the fiscal year 1975 foreign assistance authorization bill.
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tions. The law required the executive to report military sales of $25
million or more to Congress, and Congress was given twenty days to
veto them by a concurrent resolution.81 Whereas Congress had al-
ways had control over grants, because grants require appropriation,
this new law gave Congress measure of control over arms sales as
well."'
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act8" passed in 19764 gave Congress a great deal of control, which
remains today. Congress retained the right to veto proposed arms
sales and extended the period of time during which a proposed sale
could be vetoed from twenty days to thirty days.85 The Act placed a
ceiling on commercial arms sales - sales to non-NATO countries
over $25 million were required to be on a government-to-government
basis. The Act required the president to submit arms transfer quar-
terly reports to Congress. Last, the Act required that security assis-
tance be withheld from governments that engaged in human rights
violations."'
3. Carter Years.-Perhaps the most significant United States
period of attempt, since World War II, to restrain arms transfer was
made during the Carter administration. 87 The administration's arms
transfer policy attempted both unilateral restraint and international
arms transfer reduction through multilateral negotiations.88
The Carter administration affirmed the preceding congressional
initiatives limiting the sale of arms to foreign countries.89 In 1977
President Carter announced his arms sales policy, stating that con-
ventional arms transfers would be viewed as an "exceptional foreign
policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be
clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national se-
curity interests."90 The policy established controls on transfers to all
Act of Dec. 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 1814 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2776).
81. Whittle, Controls on Arms Sales Lifted After Failure of Carter Policy to Reduce
Flow of Weapons, published in 40 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 798 (Apr. 10,
1982).
82. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 9-10.
83. Arms Export Control Act, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C. (1982)).
84. The Arms Export Control Act ushered in the present period of strict procedure and
control over arms sales. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 10.
85. Id. The Supreme Court since declared the "legislative veto" unconstitutional in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For a discussion of the effect of Chadha on selected United
States foreign policy issues, including arms transfer, see Pomerance, United States Foreign
Relations Law After Chadha, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 201 (1985).
86. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 10.
87. See generally text pp. 9-10, and pp. 20-24 (discussing Conventional Arms Transfer
Talks with the Soviet Union).
88. See R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 11-12.
89. Id. at 10.
90. A Foreign Policy Based on America's Essential Character: President Carter An-
[Vol. 6:3
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nations except NATO members, Japan, Australia, and New Zea-
land. The controls were binding "unless extraordinary circumstances
necessitate a Presidential exception, or where I determine that coun-
tries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weap-
onry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to main-
tain a regional balance." '91
In retrospect, the Carter policy of unilateral restraint was not
entirely successful. 92 Even though the administration established
guidelines and controls that required disclosure and interagency co-
ordination,93 arms sales were not an "exceptional" implement of for-
eign policy, nor did the dollar ceiling reduce the volume of sales dur-
ing the Carter presidency.94  The United States conducted
Conventional arms transfer talks with the Soviet Union, but the
talks fell short of their objective of limiting the arms sales of the
other major supplier nations.95
The Carter administration's policy on arms transfers empha-
sized unilateral restraint in order to set the example for eventual
multilateral restraint.96 The Carter administration was successful in
instigating multilateral restraint negotiations among NATO allies,
and at bilateral Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks with the
Soviet Union.97 By contrast, the Reagan administration is willing to
listen to other's proposals, but says it is unwilling to jeopardize
United States interests by unilateral restraint.98
nounces Policy on Transfers of Conventional Arms, 76 DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN 621, 625
(1977).
91. Id. This policy statement was announced on May 19, 1977. More specifically, the
policy included the following features: (1) The United States would reduce the dollar volume
of new commitments. A $8.5 billion ceiling was set for fiscal year 1978, which represented an
eight percent decrease from the prior year new commitments to nonexempt nations. These
goals did not include commercial sales, which are sales made by manufacturers directly to
foreign governments under U.S. license, nor did these goals include non-weapons factors, such
as military construction. (2) The United States would not transfer newly developed advanced
weapons until the weapons were operationally deployed with U.S. forces. (3) The human rights
posture of a potential arms recipient country, and the economic impact of arms transfers to
countries receiving U.S. economic assistance, would be considered. (4) Weapons would not be
developed, nor existing weapons significantly modified, solely for export. (5) Coproduction
agreements would not be permitted for significant weapons, equipment, and major components.
(6) Retransfer of weapons to third-party countries would not be permitted. (7) Proponents,
and not opponents, of an arms sale would have the "burden of persuasion." (8) Attempt would
be made to remove economic incentives for arms sales, such as lower per unit cost for Defense
Department procurement of items. (9) U.S. government employees abroad were prohibited
from helping arms salesman without express permission from Washington. (10) Reduction in
international arms transfer would be attempted through multilateral negotiations. Id.
92. See R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 11.
93. Id. at 10. See also A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 52, 59, and 61-62.
94. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 57-58.
95. The Carter administration's effort at negotiating multilateral restraint was the Con-
ventional Arms Transfer Talks with the Soviet Union, discussion more fully in this Comment
infra p. 360.
96. See R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 11-12.
97. See infra pp. 360-63.
98. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 17-18.
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4. The Reagan Administration.-In contrast to the Carter
policy of attempting to control United States arms sales abroad, the
emphasis under the Reagan administration shifted to arms sales as a
key foreign policy instrument." The Reagan administration views
weapons transfers as "an essential element of its global defense pos-
ture and an indispensable component of its foreign policy."' 100
President Reagan's first official statement on arms transfer, on
July 8, 1981, focused on the use of arms sales to counter the Soviet
challenge."0' According to President Reagan, the United States must
not only strengthen its own military capabilities but must be pre-
pared to help its friends and allies to strength their military capabili-
ties through the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of
military assistance. 02 The Reagan policy has no rigid decision-mak-
ing guidelines.' 0 3 Requests for arms will be evaluated on a "case by
case" basis with "high priority" given to major alliance partners and
to those countries with which the United States has cooperative se-
curity relationships.104
The Reagan policy overturned the Carter administration's qual-
itative restrictions on arms transfer. 10 5 The Reagan policy neither
bars the United States from being the first to introduce new or more
advanced weapons into a region' nor prohibits transfer of arms
before they become operationally deployed with United States
forces.'
The Reagan policy made two other significant changes. One
change is that the Reagan policy specifically provides that arms sales
can help to enhance United States defense production capabilities
and efficiency. 08 The other change is that President Reagan re-
99. Id. at 15.
100. See Conventional Arms Transfers Policy, DEP'T. OF STATE BULLETIN 61 (Sept.
1981) [hereinafter Conventional Arms Transfers]. In contrast, the Carter policy stated that
arms transfers were to be an "exceptional implement of foreign policy." See notes 91-92 and
accompanying text. The stated goals of the Reagan administration policy are as follows: (1)
help deter aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends and allies; (2) increase military
effectiveness by improving U.S. ability in conjunction with its friends and allies "to project
power in response to threats posed by mutual adversaries"; (3) support efforts that "foster the
ability of our forces to deploy and operate with those of our friends and allies," thereby
strengthening our mutual security relationships; (4) demonstrate the enduring interest that the
U.S. has in its friends and allies "and that it will not allow them to be at a military disadvan-
tage"; (5) "foster regional and internal stability, thus encouraging peaceful resolution of dis-
putes and evolutionary change"; and (6) help enhance U.S. defense production capabilities and
efficiency. Id.
101. Conventional Arms Transfers, supra note 100, at 61.
102. Id.
103. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 15.
104. Id. In contrast to this flexible approach, the Carter policy tightened procedures and
controls. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 15.
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 17. By contrast, the Carter policy attempted to remove the incentive to use
[Vol. 6:3
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scinded the Carter directive that prohibited United States officials
abroad from helping United States arms manufacturers.109
The United States presently transfers military materials and
services through several programs." 0 The major programs are (1)
arms sales to lower per unit production costs to domestic arms. Id.
109. Id.
110. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. SECURITY AND MILI-
TARY ASSISTANCE: PROGRAMS AND RELATED AcrIVITIEs-AN UPDATE (report number GAO/
NSIAD-85-158) (Sept. 30, 1985). The General Accounting Office report describes the several
present United States Arms Transfer Programs more fully as follows:
(I) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program - Sections 23 and
24 of the Arms Export Control Act, Act of June 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 729 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.), authorize the President to help
finance the purchase of defense articles and services by friendly foreign govern-
ments and international organizations. The FMS has provided assistance
through two types of loans - direct and guaranteed. Under direct loans the
Department of Defense finances defense article procurement out of appropriated
funds. Guaranteed loans do not use appropriated funds, but are financed through
the Department of the Treasury's Federal Financing Bank. Direct loans were
used from 1968 until the mid-1970's. Beginning in 1975 when all new loans had
to be the guaranteed type, guaranteed loans were the predominant type, with the
exception of continued direct loans to Egypt and Israel. Starting in 1985, all new
loans had to be the direct type.
id. at 2-18.
(2) FMS Sales Agreements. - In addition to sales financed with FMS
credits or grants, a country may buy United States military equipment and ser-
vices with cash, under FMS sales agreements. FMS cash transactions, author-
ized by the Arms Export Control Act, Act of June 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 729 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.), enable eligible foreign
governments to purchase defense articles, services and training from the United
States government. The Department of Defense provides items or services from
Department of Defense stocks in accordance with section 21 of the Arms Export
Control Act, id., or by procuring the items from United States firms in accor-
dance with section 22 of the Act, id. When the source of supply is new procure-
ment, the United States government agency or military department assigned
cognizance for the procurement enters into a contract with the company to pro-
vide the item or service.
Id. at 36.
(3) The Military Assistance Program (MAP). - The MAP is authorized
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Act of Sept. 4, 1961, 75
Stat. 424 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 1701, and in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.). MAP provides grant funding for defense articles and services. Initially,
the program's purpose was to strengthen the mutual defense and collective se-
curity of the non-Communist world. MAP is now used to retain United States
military base rights, maintain regional arms balances, encourage greater mili-
tary self reliance on the part of certain nations, and promote aid to financially
strapped countries which would have difficulty repaying loans. In the 1970's,
when the United States was using loans as the primary means of providing mili-
tary assistance, MAP funding declined, but beginning in 1982, MAP funding
was made available for financing FMS cases, and MAP has increased steadily
since 1982.
Id. at 24-28.
(4) Lease. - In addition to making sales and grants, the United States
leases equipment to foreign countries and international organizations, as author-
ized by chapter 6 of the Arms Export Control Act. Act of June 30, 1976, 90
Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
Id. at 44-45.
(5) Equipment Loan. - Lending military equipment to foreign countries is
authorized under exceptional circumstances in accordance with section 503 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Act of Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 424 (codified
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the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program and the FMS
Sales Agreements Program, through which the Defense Department
makes arrangements with recipient states for credit sales and cash
sales; (2) the Military Assistance Program, by which the United
States makes grants; and (3) commercial sales, by which recipient
states deal directly with United States manufacturers who must re-
ceive a license for a particular sale from the State Department.
Equipment is leased and loaned through other programs.
B. Roles of Suppliers Other Than the United States
1. The Soviet Union.-The Soviet Union is now the world's
largest supplier of arms. Soviet deliveries to developing countries
rose from $3.5 billion in 1973 to $6.7 billion in 1980.111 The Soviet
Union ships arms to the Middle East, " 2 Asia, a13 Sub-Sahara Af-
rica,114 and Latin America.11 5
Soviet arms transfer motives are to gain political influence, to
support ideologically compatible regimes, and to gain access to base
facilities. An increasingly important Soviet motive in recent years is
getting hard currency to finance Moscow's imports of food and tech-
nology from the West. "' Thus, the Soviets have concentrated on
countries able to pay in cash, such as Libya, Iraq, and Algeria, and
have cut back on grants of military aid and credit terms." 7 In the
past, the Soviet Union sold its highest technology only to Eastern
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 1701, and in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). Such lending
is restricted to MAP recipients.
id. at 45.
(6) Commercial Sales. - United States arms are transferred to foreign
countries by commercial sales - deals between the foreign government and the
United States manufacturer, under United States government license. The State
Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC) has responsibility for oversee-
ing commercial sales. The OMC coordinates commercial sales requests with the
appropriate regional bureau of the Department of State, its counterpart in the
Department of Defense, the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Af-
fairs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and sometimes the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, and
Department of Energy. The OMC may disapprove a sale on request of any of
these agencies. Resolution of an issue follows the same interagency process as
with FMS. Finally, an export license must be issued to the United States manu-
facturer prior to the sale. Congress must be notified of all commercial sales of
major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, and of sales of all other
military items and services valued at $50 or more.
R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 33.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Middle eastern countries have been the major recipients - primarily Iraq, Syria,
and Lybia. Id.
113. Asian recipients are Vietnam and India. Id.
114. Sub-Saharan African recipients are Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Nige-
ria, Somalia, and Uganda. Id.
115. Latin American recipients are Cuba, Peru, and Nicaragua. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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European countries, whereas now the Soviets' most sophisticated
arms go to Third World countries." 8 The Soviet Union, however,
still does not generally license the production of its arms outside
Warsaw pact countries.119 Another recent change is that the Soviet
capability to transport arms quickly by air and by sea has greatly
increased.2 0
2. France.-France, the, world's third largest supplier, in-
creased transfer from $620 million to 1973 to $2.5 billion in 1980.21
France has been willing to sell to almost anybody, and on occasion
French ministers have spoken of a policy of selling weapons "without
political considerations." The arms-for-oil connection is quite
direct. 2
France actively promotes arms sales. In 1980, about forty per-
cent of the arms manufactured in France were exported. 24 More
than seventy-five percent of the French aeronautical industry weap-
ons output were sold outside France.1 5 Ninety thousand of the
280,000 workers in the French arms industry owe their jobs to arms
sales to other countries. 26
In addition to diplomatic and oil-related motives, France sees its
foreign sales as supporting its national independence in defense and
foreign policy. 2 Today, France is self-sufficient in military research
and development and in weapons production, and is capable of to-
tally meeting the needs of its own forces. 28
One recent rend in French policy resembles that of the United
States. Prior to the 1970's, most French arms transferred went to
Western industrial countries. 29 Since the 1970's, Third World coun-
tries, particularly in the Middle East, are the major recipients. In
1980 about fifty-five percent of French arms exports went to the
Middle East. 30
3. Britain.-Britain ranks fourth, having exported $600 mil-
lion in arms in 1980. That level is up from $360 million in 1973. '
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20.
121. Id.
122. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 215.
123. Id.
124. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 20.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id. Due to France's indiscriminate policy, this trend is probably a function of de-
mand. Id.
131. Measured in 1982 dollars. Id. at 22.
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Great Britain actively promotes arms sales. The Defense Sales Or-
ganization, of the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for foreign mil-
itary sales, and has personnel stationed in embassies abroad. 132 Offi-
cial decisions to sell arms are made on a case by case basis with
apparently no guidelines. The British government publicizes little in-
formation about its foreign arms sales.133
V. Past Efforts at International Restraint
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) 34 classifies all prior international efforts at arms transfer
restraint into three general types, as follows: (1) arms registration,
(2) arrangements among supplier states, and (3) arrangements
among recipient states.1 5 Most scholars of the subject follow the
ACDA format.3 6 The most significant of these past international re-
straint attempts are discussed following.
A. Arms Registration
Several attempts have been made to give international publicity
to arms transfers, in hopes that publicity would have a restraining
effect. The first notable attempt was a League of Nations yearbook
in 1925. In the 1960's, several short-lived attempts were made in the
United Nations.
1. League of Nations Armaments Yearbook.-The League of
Nations established the precedent of giving publicity to arms trans-
fers, in the hope that public knowledge would have some restraining
effect.' 37 From 1925 until 1938 the League of Nations published a
statistical yearbook on the trade of arms and ammunition. 38 The
yearbook became a model for several arms registration attempts
which followed.' 39
132. Id.
133. Id. at 23.
134. ACDA is an independent establishment of the United States government. See OF-
FICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
GOV'T. MANUAL (1985).
135. See Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology,
unpublished report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
examining United States policy on conventional arms export and approaches to developing
multilateral limitations (Sept. 17, 1986). See also UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DIS-
ARMAMENT AGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS: A REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS (April 12, 1974) (for use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to
section 302 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, PL 92-362) [hereinafter THE
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER).
136. See generally A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 275-312; BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Arms
Across the Sea, 118-22 (P. Farley, S. Kaplan & W. Lewis eds. 1978).
137. See A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 281.
138. Id. at 281.
139. See generally A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 281-82; THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER,
supra note 135, at C-5-9.
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2. United Nations' Arms Registration Attempts.-In the
1960's, several attempts were made in the United Nations to reduce
arms transfer by some registration regime. These attempts were the
Maltese Draft Resolution of 1965,141 a President Johnson proposal
for the Middle East,"" and the Danish Draft resolution of 1968.142
These attempts all failed, as discussed below.
In the First Committee of the United Nations General Assem-
bly in 1965, the Maltese Ambassador introduced a draft resolution
requesting the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC)" 3 to study arms transfers between states and to submit to
the next General Assembly proposals for establishing through the
United Nations a system of publicity on sales and transfer of
arms.' The Maltese proposal was rejected by the General Assem-
bly by a 19 to 18 vote, with 39 abstentions.145
In 1967, shortly after the Arab-Israeli conflict, President John-
son outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East.'14 These
included a proposal that the United Nations "immediately call upon
all its members to report all shipments" of arms into the area and
"keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to ob-
serve."' 147 United States Ambassador Goldberg then submitted to the
U.N. General Assembly a draft resolution that proposed achieve-
ment of "a stable and durable peace" in the area "through negoti-
ated arrangements" on the basis of President Johnson's five princi-
ples, including "registration and limitation of arms shipments into
the area. 1" 8 The Soviet Union and its Arab allies opposed the reso-
lution, and the United States decided not to press the resolution to a
vote.'49
In 1968, Denmark and three other states submitted a draft reso-
lution 50 at the General Assembly that requested the Secretary-Gen-
eral to ascertain member views on the following: (1) registration
140. 20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.347 (1965).
141. 22 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.520 (1967).
142. 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.446 (1968).
143. ENDC became the Conference Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969 after 8
new members joined. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135 at C-5.
144. Id.
145. Id. at C-6. The United States abstained and the Soviet Union and its allies voted
against the resolution. Id.
146. Id. at C-6-8.
147. Id. at C-6.
148. Id.
149. Id. The United States introduced a similar resolution in the Security Council, urg-
ing both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict to limit "the wasteful and destructive arms race in
the area." The Soviet Union submitted a resolution with similar language, but the Soviet pro-
posed resolution called for immediate withdrawal of all forces to positions occupied prior to
June 5, 1967. The question of arms shipments received little attention in Security Council
debate and both the United States and the Soviet Union decided to not press their resolutions
to a vote. Id. at C-7.
150. 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L. 446 (1968).
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with the Secretary-General of "all imports and exports of conven-
tional arms . . . " and (2) collection and publication by the Secre-
tary-General at regular intervals of information on transfers. 51 The
resolution sponsors decided not to put it to a vote. 152
In 1970, Secretary General Thant proposed that the United Na-
tions collect and publish information on conventional arms similar to
the League's Armaments Yearbook."' The Netherlands and Sweden
called attention to this proposal at the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament.' 4 The matter did not receive further attention. 55
B. Arrangements Among Supplier States
From the 1950's to the present, several multilateral efforts were
made among supplier states to curtail international arms transfer.
Several of these efforts contributed to crisis reduction when incorpo-
rated into a broader United Nations peacekeeping regime. Another
attempt that showed promise was the Conventional Arms Transfer
(CAT) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union during
the 1970's.' In addition, several noncommunist countries are active
in an international committee that has interest in the broader subject
of East-West trade policy.' 5 Following is a discussion of these multi-
lateral restraint attempts among supplier states.
1. Triparte Arrangement for the Middle East of 1950.-In
1950, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, the major
arms suppliers to the Middle East, attempted a triparte arrangement
to limit arms supply in that region. 58 At a Foreign Ministers' meet-
ing in London, the three Western powers recognized the need of
Arab states and Israel to maintain national security, but expressed
concern over an arms race.' 59 They pledged that they would take
immediate action, "both within and outside the United Nations" to
prevent violation of frontiers or armistice lines. 6 ° This triparte dec-
151. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135 at C-8-9, citing ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 728 (1968). Several developing
countries strongly opposed the resolution on grounds that it discriminated against nonaligned
countries, forcing them to join military alliances, thereby upsetting the present balance of
power in the world, and would create monopolies in the field of conventional weapons. THE
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135 at C-9 citing ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 748-51 (1968).
152. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135 at C-9.
153. Id. at C-9.
154. Id. citing CCD/PV.478, at 10, 19.
155. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-9.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 200, 206, 209, and 216.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 220-22 (discussion of Coordinating Committee
(COCOM) for East-West trade policy).
158. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-9-10.
159. Id. at C-9.
160. Id. at C-10.
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laration was implemented and was effective in reducing shipments
for several years.16'
2. Soviet Overtures on Restricting Arms to the Middle East
of 1956-57.-During a series of talks in London between Britain and
the Soviet Union, the Soviets indicated a willingness to limit arms
shipments to the Middle East.'62 The Soviets agreed to establishing a
joint committee to discuss the matter. 6 A month later, Soviet First
Party Secretary Khrushschev announced that if other states would
stop supplying arms to the Middle East through United Nations
agreement, the Soviet Union would cooperation in an arms em-
bargo.'6 4 In February, 1957, the Soviet Union proposed a joint
pledge by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and
France to cease delivering arms to the Middle East, as one of six
basic principles, which would require withdrawal of all troops mili-
tary aid and alliance for protection and to promote economic devel-
opment without any political or military conditions.' 6 5 The United
States rejected the proposal as propaganda to weaken the West mili-
tarily and exert Soviet influence over the region.'66
3. United Nations Embargoes.-The United Nations has at-
tempted many times to reduce conflict through multilateral arms
embargoes. 167 Several attempts were successful in contributing to
crisis reduction, when incorporated into a broader United Nations
peacemaking regime. 6 8
In 1948 during the Palestine conflict, the Security Council
adopted a cease fire and arms embargo. 69 All parties to the conflict
accepted the terms.17 0
In 1951 the United Nations imposed a strategic embargo
against North Korea and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
upon the advice of a group especially established by the General As-
sembly.' 7 ' A General Assembly resolution called upon members to
161. In 1954, the U.S. supplied arms to Iran without restrictions. Id. Egypt was of-
fended because Egypt sought arms from the U.S. since 1948 and was prevented by various
United States restrictions, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-10, and the
triparte declaration. Id. In 1955, Egyptian President Sadat announced an agreement with
Czechoslovakia, stating that Egypt had applied to the Western powers for arms "but all we got
were demands." Id. at C-10, citing N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1955, at A4, col. 5.
162. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-I 1-12.
163. Id. citing N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1956, at Al, col. 8.
164. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135 citing N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1956,
at AI, col. 8.
165. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-I 1.
166. Id. citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1957, at A4, col. 7.
167. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-12-32.
168. See infra p. 20-21.
169. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-12-13.
170. Id.
171. Id. at C-13-14.
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apply an embargo to areas controlled by the PRC and North Ko-
rea. 712 The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, even
though the Soviet Union refused to participate. 17 3
Several other United Nations Arms Embargoes were successful
to a limited extent. In 1956, the First Emergency Special Assembly
of the General Assembly adopted a cease fire and arms embargo res-
olution for the purpose of finding a solution to the Suez crisis.17 The
General Assembly has adopted several resolutions in the past twenty
five years aimed at stopping arms shipments to South Africa, in ef-
forts to induce abandonment of the apartheid policy.175 Beginning in
1962 and lasting through the 1970's, Asian and African efforts to
force Portugal to halt repression of rebellions in its African territo-
ries resulted in no less than ten resolutions imposing arms embargoes
against Portugal. 76 In 1965, the Security Council imposed sanctions,
including arms embargo, on the Ian Smith government in Southern
Rhodesia.17 7
4. United States Efforts to Achieve United States and Soviet
Mutual Restraint to the Middle East and Other Areas.-Since the
Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the United States has made several at-
tempts to make agreements with the Soviet Union to limit the flow
of arms to the Middle East.7 8 The efforts of the Nixon administra-
tion, in the few years following the 1967 war, failed because the So-
viets insisted on the condition that Arab and Israeli forces withdraw
and occupy pre-war lines.'7 9 In the early 1970's, President Nixon
mentioned in annual foreign policy addresses to Congress the need
for bilateral restraint in arms shipment to the Middle East, to South
Asia following the India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, and to Vietnam
following the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam, 80 but neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union took initiative. 18'
5. Conventional Arms Transfer Talks Between the United
States and the Soviet Union.-Conventional wisdom in the United
States for years had been that the Soviets would never be interested
172. Id. at C-14.
173. Id.
174. Id. at C-15.
175. Id. at C-15 n.I.
176. Id. at C-21-25.
177. Now Zimbabwe. Id. at C-25-31. This action was the response to the Security
Council's condemnation of the Ian Smith government as an "illegal racist minority regime."
Id.
178. Id. at C-32-35.
179. Id. at C-32.
180. Id. at C-35.
181. See id.
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in discussions on arms transfer restraints.8 2 Following President
Carter's election, however, Brezhnev stated that "the problem of the
international arms trade seems to merit an exchange of views."' 1 3
When Secretary of State Vance made his first official visit to Mos-
cow in March 1977, his proposals on SALT II were rejected, but
agreement was reached on establishing bilateral working groups on
several subjects, one being arms transfer. 184 United States and Soviet
arms transfer delegations, to what became termed the Conventional
Arms Transfer (CAT) talks, met first in December 1977 and three
more times over the following years.185 The talks collapsed, however,
a year after they began. 8"
At the first CAT session the Soviets listened to the United
States views, limiting their discussion to asking questions about the
new United States policy. 1' 7 The Soviets showed special interest in
the Carter administration's new annual ceiling on arms sales.' 88
At the second CAT round it appeared that substantive progress
could be attained.8 9 The Soviets sent "a responsible and constructive
diplomat,"' 90 Ambassador Lev I. Mendelevich, to the talks held in
Helsinki in May 1978.191 Mendelevich agreed that arms transfers
were a serious problem and that the two countries should work to-
ward solution. 92 The Soviets presented some legal and political prin-
ciples to serve as proposed criteria to define when arms transfers
may and may not be permissible.' 93 The United States suggested
further guidelines that reflected the new Carter policy. One guideline
was that advanced weapons should not be introduced into a region if
doing so would create a new or significantly higher combat capabil-
ity,194 and re-transfer to third party countries should be limited. 95
At this point, the United States team and the State Department
wanted to begin focusing the talks on limitations of transfers to spe-
cific regions.'90 The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), on the other hand, preferred the classical and more techni-
cal arms control approach of concentrating on global restrictions on
182. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 286.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 285-90.
186. Id. at 286.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 287,
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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certain weapons without attention to certain regions.197
At the CAT third round, it became evident that the Soviets
were dealing in earnest.' 98 The talks were progressing better than
many in the United States had anticipated. 9 9 The participants
agreed upon a framework to work toward both regional and arms
control restraints. Although initially reluctant to discuss regional re-
straints, the Soviets were persuaded to work toward conducting ex-
change of views on a region by region basis with the objective of
establishing guidelines for restraint of transfers into particular re-
gions. The participants also agreed to draw up general principles for
mutual restraint in military-political and military-technical terms."°
Prior to the fourth, and what would become the final round of
Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks, deep differences emerged
within the Carter administration.2 ' Zbignew Brzezinski, the presi-
dent's national security adviser, attacked the direction the CAT talks
were taking. 202 Brzezinski particularly objected to discussion of the
West Asia and East Asia regions.2 3 Leslie Gelb, the chief United
States delegate to the CAT talks,20 4 believed that we should listen to
what the Soviets would have to say about those regions. 0 5 President
Carter reversed his previous position in favor of focusing discussion
on regions, and the President sided with Brzezinski and Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown, concluding that the United States would not
negotiate on the West Asia and East Asia regions."' The pending
normalization of relations with China was a factor that could have
influenced Carter's decision. 07 After much debate, the United States
delegation was instructed to refuse to listen and walk out if the Sovi-
ets brought up arms transfer restraints to West Asia and East
Asia. 08
197. Id.
198. Id. at 288.
199. Id.
200. Id. Examples include prohibitions that would be established on export of certain
types of weapons such as long range surface to surface missiles and on arms of particular use
to terrorists. Id.
201. Id. at 288.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Gelb was at the time director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs.
205. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 288.
206. Id. at 289.
207. Id. This development was not known to all parties who had input into the decision.
Instability in Iran could have been another factor that influenced Carter's reversal on the
issue. Perhaps more than any specific factor influencing the decision to not discuss those re-
gions, was a general change in attitude within the administration on Soviet relations. Id.
208. Id. at 289. Such a dispute may have been unprecedented in the annals of United
States diplomacy. The dispute continued in communications between Brzezinski and Gelb in
Mexico City, the site of the fourth round of CAT talks. At one point Gelb was ordered by the
White House to return to Washington, but the order was rescinded. Feud in Administration
Said to Endanger Talks on Arms Sales Pact, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1978, at Al2, col. 3;
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In the fourth round of talks in Mexico City, the Soviets were
angry at United States unwillingness to consider regions of Soviet
concern. 20 9 The Soviets refused to limit the agenda to United States
proposed regions of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. 210 The
fourth round ended in deadlock.21 Detente deteriorated in 1979, and
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. 212 The CAT talks were finished.
Personal disagreements and personality clashes among United
States decision makers were not the central cause of the United
States contribution to collapse of the CAT talks. 3 More fundamen-
tal was the lack of consensus regarding the purposes and limitations
of CAT talks, and the role of arms transfers in foreign policy.21 4
The State Department viewed the political ramifications of the
CAT talks as more important than the technical issues of arms
transfer restraint.18 The State Department hoped that one outcome
of the negotiations would be a better mutual understanding of Soviet
and United States objectives in the Third World as a basis for regu-
lating their activities in that region.2 16 This was the reason for the
State Department CAT strategy of focusing on restraining arms
transfers to particular regions rather than on controlling transfers of
specific weapons systems worldwide. 17
A highly regarded expert on the subject of foreign policy as-
pects of international arms transfer, Dr. Andrew J. Pierre, 218 be-
lieves that concentrating so heavily on bilateral talks with the Soviet
Union, without West European supplier involvement, was a mistake.
Dr. Pierre concluded as follows:
If intra-Alliance consultations had been far more extensive
they might have given a resulting Western position greater solid-
ity, making it less vulnerable to internal Washington bureau-
cratic struggles. At a minimum they would have forced the
United States to think through its approach before the negotia-
tions had reached a substantive stage.219
6. COCOM Strategic Trade Controls.-Since the outbreak of
Policy Shift Puts Arms Sales Talks in Doubt, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1978, at Al, col. 2; J.
Porro, Conventional Arms Sales in the Carter Administration. An Interview with Leslie Gelb,
10 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 1 (Sept. 1980).
209. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 289.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 289-90.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 290.
216. Id.
217. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 13.
218. Author of THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES, supra note 1, and other works.
219. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 290.
Spring 1988]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the Korean War in 1950, the United States and some of its principal
allies have controlled their exports of strategic goods to communist
countries through a multilateral organization known as the Consulta-
tive Group and its working committee, the Coordinating Committee
(COCOM) for East-West trade policy.220 The COCOM operates
without formal treaty or charter and is not a part of any other inter-
national organization.221 The COCOM maintains international em-
bargo lists of strategic materials.222
C. Arrangements Among Recipient States
Another approach to international restraints has been to place
the burden on the recipient states. Historically, this approach has
been implemented in attempts that have centered on regions of the
world.223
In 1966 the United States urged the Conference on the Com-
mittee on Disarmament (CCD)224 to adopt a formal multilateral ar-
rangement to achieve restraint within regions.225 In addition to sup-
plier restraints, the proposal provided for states within a region to
agree not to acquire certain weapons and to make information avail-
able to each other.226 The proposal met with lack of CCD interest.227
In the early 1970's the Nixon administration urged the United
Nations to initiate discussion of regional conventional arms control.
No concrete suggestions were offered and the episode was short
lived.228
In the mid-1970's, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament
considered proposals for purchaser restraint.2 9 The United States
did not wholeheartedly support this approach.23 ' A 1976 State De-
partment paper to members of Congress who expressed interest in
arms reduction stated that an agreement among suppliers to regulate
weapons sales would amount to a "cartelization" of the world arms
trade, and that cartels had historically worked effectively when sup-
pliers shared some interest.231 The paper concluded that the largest
suppliers did not have a common interest, and thus the most promis-
220. THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, at C-35-37.
221. Id. at C-36.
222. Id.
223. See discussion infra pp. 25-27.
224. Originally the United Nations Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC),
the Committee became the CCD in 1969 after addition of eight new members. THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSFER, supra note 135, C-5 n.l.
225. Id. at C-37-41.
226. Id. at C-39-40.
227. Id. at 40.
228. Id. at C-41-42.
229. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 282-83.
230. Id. at 283.
231. Id.
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ing multilateral restraint proposals "will be those that derive from
initiatives taken by leaders in the regions concerned. ' 32  In com-
menting on this episode, one well-respected scholar on the subject of
arms transfer restraint concludes that "although the recipient states
must be brought into a regime of restraints - on the basis of their
self-interests and in a cooperative manner rather than having curbs
imposed upon them - the primary initiatives must be made by com-
bination of suppliers. '3 3
Latin America is the only region in which arms recipient states
have made a significant attempt to develop regional agreement on
restraint.234 The Declaration of Ayacucho236 was signed on Decem-
ber 9, 1974, by eight Latin American states.2 30 Discussions among
the signatories, designed to freeze existing ratios of weapons-to-man-
power and levels of military expenditures in relation to gross national
product, broke down within two years.237 Subsequent negotiations
among only Peru, Chile, and Bolivia bogged down. 38 In 1978 the
president of Venezuela took the initiative in reactivating the Ayacu-
cho Declaration and organized a meeting of foreign ministers of sig-
natories as an activity at the United Nations Special Session on Dis-
armament. 3 9 In a separate initiative, the president of Mexico
proposed to the Organization of American states that all Latin
American and Caribbean states establish a body to set limits on con-
ventional arms transfer.24 0 Twenty states, including Cuba, meeting
in Mexico City in August, 1978, agreed to exchange information on
purchases and work toward a regime of restraints. "
VI. Pros and Cons to the United States of Arms Transfer
Curtailment
World arms transfer provides some advantages and disadvan-
tages to the United States. On the positive side, shoring up allies'
military capability may enhance United States security and regional
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 819
(1974).
236. The persons who attended and who signed the Declaration were the chiefs of state
of Bolivia, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela, and representatives of Argentina, Colombia, Chile,
and Ecuador. Id. at 819-21 (1974) (a United State Department of State translation). The
Declaration agreed and encouraged to support a permanent international peace and coopera-
tion and "to create conditions that permit the effective limitation of armaments and put an end
to their acquisition for offensive warlike ends, in order to dedicate all possible resources to the
economic and social development of each of the countries of Latin America." Id.
237. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 284.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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objectives. Also, arms transfer can provide diplomatic leverage. On
the negative side, some United States technological secrets have been
compromised through export of sophisticated weapons. Arms trans-
fer can also increase tensions in regions of the world and can
destabilize regional balances.
A. Reasons Why the United States Would Not Want Arms Sales
Curtailed
Shipping arms abroad can benefit United States national secur-
ity, through strengthening collective security arrangements with al-
lies and by contributing to regional stability. In addition to being a
security instrument, arms transfers can be an important United
States instrument of diplomacy. 4 2 An increasingly important United
States consideration is that if the United States does not make a
particular arms transfer another country will. These benefits from
United States arms export are discussed below.
1. Support of National Security.-As one means of providing
national security since World War II, the United States has entered
into a number of collective security arrangements with other na-
tions. 243 Through security assistance, allies assume regional responsi-
bilities that the United States might have to assume in the interest
of national security.2" Arms sales are an alternative to United
States forces in a region.243
Access to military bases abroad is a factor that enhances United
States national security.24 Arms sales are important to maintenance
of many of these bases. For example, arms assistance to the Philip-
pines is regarded as a quid pro quo for the use of United States
bases there, and those bases are critical to the maintenance of the
United States as an Asian and Pacific power and to the projection of
United States power in to the Indian Ocean.247
2. Foreign Policy Tool.-Arms sales can be effective instru-
242. See infra text accompanying note 250.
243. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 61.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 61-62. Proponents of arms sales cite several examples. Greece and Turkey
protect the southern flank of NATO. Turkey occupies a strategic position; Turkey controls
access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and faces the Soviet Union over the longest
land border of any NATO country. With modern arms these countries balance Soviet interests
without the presence of United States forces. Id. at 62.
246. Id.
247. U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND
RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., part 6 at 757 (1981),
cited in R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 65 n.1 1.
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ments of foreign policy.2 " Clearly, arms can be used to influence
decision makers of a country, and to demonstrate United States
friendship. 49 Arms sale can provide leverage. For example, Presi-
dent Carter used arms sale to Egypt to encourage Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat to work toward the Camp David accords.2 50
3. Economic Benefits.-"Arms sales earn foreign exchange
and improve the United States balance of payments." '251 Arms sales
made up 4.7 percent of total United States exports in 1984.252 Arms
sales to European allies partially offset the cost of United States
forces stationed there, and sales in the Persian Gulf region recoup
dollars spent on oil.253 Other economic benefits are a positive effect
on United States employment2 ' and an assistance in obtaining criti-
cal raw materials such as Middle East oil.2 55 Also, military sales
abroad can lower unit cost of arms for use by United States
forces.256 Larger Defense Department orders to manufacturers lower
unit cost through overhead savings2 57 and United States government
and manufacturers recoup a portion of research and development ex-
penses from military sales abroad. 58
4. United States Refusal to sell would leave markets to other
suppliers.-"If we don't sell, others will," is a common cliche used
by proponents. 259 This statement was born out by a 1981 Congres-
sional Research Service study.2 60 The study showed that the value of
United States arms transfers to the Third World declined during the
Carter years. During the same period, the Soviet Union nearly
doubled the value of the agreements it had the previous four years,
and in 1979, for the first time, the estimated value of Soviet arms
deliveries exceeded United States deliveries. France tripled its agree-
ments, and Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy each doubled
248. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 67.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 68-69.
251. Id. at 70.
252. WMEAT, supra note 25, at 13. This is up from 3.1 percent in 1979. R. LABRIE,
supra note 52, at 70.
253. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 70.
254. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY, I (CBO Staff Working Paper) (July 23, 1976) [hereinafter CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE]. The study determined that approximately 42,000 jobs are provided
by every $1 billion in arms sales.
255. Id.
256. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 71.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 76; see also A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 43.
260. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. ARMS
TRANSFER POLICY, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIEN-
TIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
12-26 (Sept. 25, 1981).
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their agreements. The United States lost its worldwide lead in sales
of four of the standard twelve weapons categories, and its dominance
as an arms supplier slipped in all the regional markets.2 61 This turn
of events is discouraging to prospects for multilateral arms transfer
restraints involving the Soviet Union. Were CAT talks involving the
Soviet Union to resume now, the Soviets would be negotiating from
a position of much more strength than they had in the early Carter
years at the time of CAT talks.262
B. Reasons Why the United States Would Wants Arms Sales
Curtailed
Arms transfer reduction would serve United States interests in
several ways. First, foreign arms sales are not always in the United
States national security interest. For example, some United States
technological secrets have been compromised through export of so-
phisticated weapons. 63 Another example is that arms recipients may
use arms in ways counter to United States intentions. " United
States arms supply in return for base privileges puts the United
States in a dependency position that can cause problems.2 5 On occa-
sion United States force readiness has been reduced because of arms
supply commitments to other countries." 6 Another argument made
by conventional arms transfer critics is that elevating nations to a
military power with conventional arms can whet their appetites for
nuclear arms. 7 Additionally, arms transfer critics contend that be-
ing a leading arms supplier undermines the perception of the United
States as a world peacemaker."6
261. Id.
262. Indeed, how much incentive do the Soviets have at all for participating in CAT
talks again, now?
263. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 39. For example, when the Shah was toppled by the
Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, some classified technology may have been compromised.
The Navy assumed that the Phoenix air-to-air missile was compromised, giving the Soviets not
only the technology to use themselves, but to develop effective countermeasures against United
States use. Id. at 39-40.
264. For example, Turkey, a NATO ally, used United States arms to invade Cyprus in
1974. Also, Israel used United States supplied arms for non-defensive purposes in its invasion
of Lebanon in 1978. Additionally, Argentina used F-4's against British forces in the Falkland
Island War. Id. at 40.
265. For example, when Congress sought to punish Turkey for the Cyprus invasion by
putting an embargo on arms to Turkey, Turkey retaliated by no longer allowing United States
intelligence-gathering activities at United States bases in Turkey. Id. at 41.
266. Id. at 41-42. For example, following depletion by the 1973 Israeli war, the United
States spent four years rebuilding an adequate level of armored personnel carriers within
United States units. Id. at 42.
267. Id. One expert stated that "conventional capabilities do not substitute for the politi-
cal influence and prestige which are perceived to accrue to possessors of nuclear weapons."
Baker, Arms Transfers and Nuclear Proliferation, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE, NEGOTIATING SECURITY, AN ARMS CONTROL READER, 161 (W. Kincade & J.
Porro eds. 1979).
268. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 42-43. President Carter, during his presidential cam-
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The second reason why the United States would want to curtail
arms transfer is that sales do not always provide the intended diplo-
matic leverage.2 69 Until the 1970's most United States arms supplied
were by grant, which tended to carry diplomatic influence.2 70 Pres-
ently, however, the greatest volume of transfer occurs by cash sale,
which carries little diplomatic leverage.21 This is particularly so now
that the international weapons market is such that the oft-cited
phrase is very true: "If we don't sell to them, somebody else will."
Third, economic benefit to the United States from arms transfer
is actually not significant.2 72 Arms sales are a small help to the bal-
ance of payments problem,2 7 3 since arms sales accounted for only
about four to five percent of exports in 1980.274 Arms transfer propo-
nents' argument about employment is weak, considering a 1976 Con-
gressional Budget Office study showed that a total United States ban
on arms sales would raise the 1981 unemployment rate by only 0.3
percent.2 5 Also, arms transfer does not significantly support the
United States mobilization industrial base. In 1977 only one of the
top ten United States defense industry contractors depended on sales
abroad, 2 7 and foreign sales accounted for only about twelve percent.
of the business volume of the other nine.
The 1976 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study showed
that foreign arms sales do not significantly improve manufacturing
economies of scale and do not thereby lower unit cost for domestic
arms. The CBO study estimated that foreign military sales were re-
sponsible for less than a one percent savings in the Department of
Defense budget in that year. 7
Fourth, sales can exacerbate tensions among neighbors and
destabilize regional balances. Supporters of arms sales restraint con-
tend that United States arms supply has played a role in the arms
race among the Persian Gulf states.279 The United States is also in-
paign said that the United States "cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and
the world's leading supplier of weapons of war." Id. at 44.
269. Id. at 44. For a detailed discussion of the arms transfers as an instrument of influ-
ence in diplomacy, see Lewis, supra note 62, at ch. 11.
270. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 44.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 46-51.
273. Id. at 46-47.
274. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 24.
275. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 254, at 21-25.
276. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 47-48.
277. Id.
278. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY COST SAVINGS TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE RESULTING FROM FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 13-15 (Congressional Budget
Office Staff Working Paper) (May 24, 1976). A United States arms transfer scholar noted
that a United Kingdom Parliament Public Accounts Committee reached the same conclusion
with regard to British arms sales. A. PIERRE, supra note 1, at 105.
279. R. LABRIE, supra note 52, at 51.
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volved in South American arms races. One example deals with
Peru's competition against Ecuador and. Chile.2"' In the 1970's, the
United States denied F-5 aircraft to Peru and vetoed a proposed sale
of Israeli Kfir fighters, with United States engines, to Ecuador, but
other suppliers quickly met the demand.28'
Last, wars have become more destructive than they would be
without foreign-supplied arms. The largest tank battle in the history
of mankind occurred during the 1973 Middle East War with United
States and Soviet tanks.282 Anti-tank and air-to-ground precision-
guided munitions greatly increased the quantities of arms destroyed,
and increased potential that the superpowers could be drawn into a
conflict to resupply their clients.2 83 In 1973, the Soviet Union
threatened to send troops to save Egyptian forces from being over-
whelmed by the Israelis, which resulted in a tense confrontation with
the United States, and caused Washington to raise its nuclear alert
level. 28 4
VII. Prospects for Multilateral Conventional Arms Transfer
Restraints
Prospects for international cooperation on arms transfer re-
straint appear to be worsening, considering the lessons of the past
and tends of the present. Arms transfer registration and recipient
state cooperation attempts have never contributed significantly to
arms transfer restraint. Several attempts at cooperation by arms sup-
plier states have been successful to a limited degree. In those in-
stances, arms supply curtailment was limited in scope, of short dura-
tion, and often in the context of a broader United Nations
peacekeeping regime, or due to the strong diplomatic leadership by
an individual or state. Present United States policy and activity, and
international conditions, however, lack the ingredients conducive to
multilateral reduction.
A. Lessons of the Past
Arms registration 285 and arms recipient cooperation 286 have re-
peatedly failed to work in the past. Only cooperation by suppliers
has been successful in achieving goals of restraint, and then only
when focused on a particular region of the world and usually toward
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. H. KISSINGER, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, 583-88 (1982).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See supra pp. 356-58.
286. See supra pp. 364-65.
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correcting a particular crisis."'
Multilateral attempts to reduce arms transfer by central collec-
tion and publication of information have never met with success. The
League of Nations Armaments Yearbook accomplished nothing and
initiatives of United Nations members to establish similar registers
received little interest.2"'
Arms recipient agreements have an equally poor record of suc-
cess.28 9 The only region in the world where a significant effort has
been made is Latin America. 9 Ten recipient nations agreed in 1979
to work on multilateral agreement but only two years later the inter-
est had dissipated. 91
Arms supplier cooperation is the only avenue of restraint that
has some history of success. 92 The United Nations arms embargoes
by suppliers on several occasions stabilized regional crises for
months, usually when coupled with concerted diplomatic and eco-
nomic efforts. 93 On the occasions when these cooperation efforts
were successful, the major world suppliers were able to reach agree-
ment, and limited success was possible without Soviet participation
- success within a region and lasting for a time period measured in
months. 9 The CAT talks between the Soviet Union and the United
States during the Carter administration are the only example of an
effort both involving the Soviet Union and with the goal of general
and global arms transfer reduction that approached success. 9 5 In the
CAT talks, the Soviet Union wanted to orient the effort toward gen-
eral global reduction, and the United States forced a change in di-
rection toward a regional focus and eventual deadlock because of
United States inability to compromise certain regions.298
B. Obstacles to New Breakthroughs
Since the limited multilateral successes in the 1960's and the
1970's, the number of suppliers and recipients have increased and
recipients have become widely dispersed. "97 The United States and
Soviet roles as largest and second largest supplier have reversed;298
consequently, the United States has less leverage when suggesting
287. See generally supra pp. 358-64.
288. See supra pp. 356-58.
289. See supra pp. 364-65.
290. See supra text accompanying note 234.
291. See supra text accompanying note 237.
292. See supra pp. 358-64.
293. See supra pp. 359-60.
294. Id.
295. See supra pp. 360-64.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 196, 199, 200, 205, and 206.
297. See supra p. 345.
298. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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mutual reduction to the Soviets. History has shown that lasting ef-
forts to control arms transfer on a global or regional basis are not
likely to succeed without Soviet and other significant suppliers' coop-
eration.2 99 The Soviet Union has not shown interest in arms transfer
limitations since 1976. France is now the third largest supplier of
world arms and France has become indiscriminate in her policy. Her
motives are more economic than humanitarian.3 0
C. Present United States Policy
The Reagan administration's present conventional arms export
policy is described in a September 17, 1986, State Department re-
port to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions.30 The Reagan approach does not seek supplier cooperation.
Rather, the approach seeks to reduce the conditions within countries
and regions that create arms demand, and secondarily continues to
support United nations efforts.3"2
The report concludes that seeking cooperation among major
suppliers is at this time an unworkable approach, because the Soviet
Union and other major suppliers show no interest, and European
suppliers are economically motivated.30 3 Regarding the Soviet
Union, the report concurs with the Western European assessment
that Soviet cooperation is essential to a restraint regime, given that
the Soviet Union is the largest individual supplier and that the So-
viet Eastern European allies are important suppliers.30 In reference
to Western European motivations, the report states that whereas
United States transfers are directed toward enhancing the security
of friends and allies and maintaining stability, arms transfers of
many Western European suppliers are motivated largely by econom-
ics related to production cost reduction, balance of payments, and
domestic employment.0 5 Another factor that the report cites is that
the number of arms suppliers providing sophisticated arms further
complicates the potential to develop an effective broadly-based re-
straint regime. 06 The total number of arms exporters increased
nearly fifty percent from 1973 to 1983.807 Thus, the report concludes
299. See infra text accompanying note 304; see generally supra pp. 356-65.
300. See supra p. 355.
301. Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Report to the Chairman, United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (unpublished report) (Sept. 17, 1986) (stating
that it reports on export of conventional arms, in compliance with the reporting requirement of
Section 129 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 and dele-
gation of authority under Executive Order 12163).
302. Id. at 12-13.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 14.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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that a broad-based restraint regime focused on supplier cooperation
is unrealistic and unworkable. 0 8
The present Reagan administration approach is focused on re-
gional conflict resolution, dealing with underlying motivations for
arms acquisitions.30 9 The emphasis is on regional security and confi-
dence-building measures designed to reduce the pressures to buy
arms.310 The report cites one initiative in this regard. President Rea-
gan addressed the United Nations General Assembly on October 24,
1985, proposing that a negotiation process be established among the
warring parties in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and
Nicaragua, to bring about an improvement in internal conditions. 11
In the course of negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union
should discuss supporting the warring parties in verified elimination
of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside
arms.312 The report states that the State Department hopes the Sovi-
ets will respond positively to this initiative that offers the best pros-
pect of arms transfer restraint in specific country and regional
contexts.3 13
The present United States approach puts a secondary emphasis
on supporting United Nations ongoing efforts.3 14 The report states
that the United States will continue to participate in and support the
forty-nation Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) 1 5 and the
United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). 1 6
An encouraging recent occurrence is that the Reagan adminis-
tration included a conventional arms control topic as part of its
agenda in the December, 1987, Reagan-Gorbachev Summit held in
308. Id.
309. Id. at 12-13.
310. Id. at 13.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 15-16.
315. The CD is the principal multilateral negotiating forum for international arms con-
trol arrangements. Id. at 15. Since 1980 the CD has been working on the text of a Compre-
hensive Program of Disarmament (CPD) that would serve as directional, but nonbinding,
guidance for states in reducing nuclear and conventional arsenals. Id.
316. Id. The United Nations and its subsidiary organization, the UNDC, since 1974 has
been discussing nuclear and conventional disarmament in its Contact Group of the Committee
of the Whole. Id. at 15-16. The Contact Group has prepared proposed recommendations on
conventional arms limitations and regional disarmament for the United Nations General As-
sembly, but the UNDC participants have not been able to reach agreement on these recom-
mendations. Id. at 15. The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly convenes
in New York every autumn to consider and make recommendations on disarmament items
referred to it by the General Assembly. Id. at 15-16. In 1985, the 40th session of the General
Assembly adopted over seventy resolutions on arms control that the First Committee recom-
mended after prolonged debate. Id. Among those supported by the United States were resolu-
tion 40/84] that condemns use of "excessively injurious" conventional weapons, resolutions
40/91]A and B which deal with the reduction of national military budgets, resolution 40/94]A
which encourages regional efforts on conventional disarmament, and resolution 40/152]D
which endorses the CD's work on a CPD. Id.
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Washington, D.C. The Summit focus, and that which received the
greatest public attention, was the signing of a treaty that limits in-
termediate range nuclear forces deployed in Europe.317 The Summit
agenda, however, included several other topics, one of which was
support for a United Nations resolution 18 imposing a conventional
arms embargo on Iran for its refusal to agree to a cease fire.319 The
United Nations Security Council, on July 20, 1987, adopted a reso-
lution 2 demanding a cease fire, but China and the Soviet Union
signaled opposition to a follow-up resolution 32 1 imposing the embargo
on Iran.322
VIII. Conclusion
For the reasons cited by the Reagan administration, 323 broad-
based restraint attained by supplier cooperation is unworkable and
unrealistic at present. The regional and specific country focus of the
policy offers the best chance of success, since it emphasizes reducing
the insecurity and conflict that created arms demand. This writer
also agrees with placement of the secondary emphasis, while still
recognizing the important of United Nations and Geneva Confer-
ence efforts. History bears out the soundness of this ordering of pri-
orities. The only arms restraint successes since World War II have
been regionally or country focused, with the major arms suppliers
involved, and many of those successes involved an arms embargo in
conjunction with a broader United Nations peacekeeping regime.
Broader-based supplier cooperation has not been successful in the
past, and the conditions that contributed to near-success on several
occasions are not present now.
Although in agreement with the stated emphasis of the Reagan
administration policy, this writer concludes that the policy will not
contribute to achieving international arms transfer reduction because
it is long on form and short on substance. In essence, the current
policy is passive. The principal example offered by the administra-
tion in support of regional stability and security emphasis is that the
President made a speech to the United Nations General Assem-
317. INF Pact to Sweeten Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2925 (Nov. 28, 1987).
318. 42 U.N: GAOR, U.N. Doc. - (1987).
319. Also on the Summit Agenda: Afghan, Persian Gulf Conflicts, 45 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2928 (Nov. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Also on the Summit Agenda]. Other agenda
topics were the Afghan conflict, human rights, and several bilateral issues, as follows: (1)
status of new embassies in Moscow and Washington, D.C.; (2) cultural exchange programs;
and (3) working conditions for United States diplomats in Moscow.
320. 42 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. (1987).
321. 42 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. (1987).
322. Also on the Summit Agenda, supra note 319, at 2928.
323. See supra text accompanying note 303.
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bly. 24 This writer does not consider speech-making to be on a par
with the leadership and implementation efforts which contributed to
the world's prior multilateral restraint successes. The State Depart-
ment cites nothing further in the way of implementation. The spe-
cific regional conflicts cited by the State Department report, as the
Reagan administration targets for gaining Soviet cooperation in re-
ducing outsider military presence, are all conflicts that the Soviet
Union started with objectives of furthering Soviet power projection.
The fact that the Reagan administration did include, as a December
1987 Summit agenda item, the United Nations conventional arms
embargo on Iran, does, however, demonstrate that the administra-
tion's policy implementation is borne out by more than rhetoric.
Prospects for successful cooperation among arms suppliers are
not good at present because (1) the Soviet Union, the largest sup-
plier, is reacting to the perceived threat of United States power pro-
jection in the world; and (2) France, the third largest volume sup-
plier in the world, behind the United States, is motivated by
economics and is indiscriminate in her approach. Geneva Convention
on Disarmament and United Nations efforts should, however, con-
tinue receiving United States support. United States emphasis on re-
gional and specific country conflicts, with the goal of reducing the
instability and insecurity that creates the arms demand, would stand
a good chance of success, however, the present United States effort
in this regard is passive. When this approach succeeded in the past it
did largely because of major power leadership, initiative, and active
involvement. Prime examples were the Carter Camp David Accord,
and the United Nations arms embargoes in conjunction with broader
peace keeping initiatives. Several major power initiatives and active
involvement contributing to these successes included concerted diplo-
matic efforts by tireless figures such as Kissinger and Carter. In the
present decade, such diplomatic effort has not been undertaken.
Success in multilateral agreement on conventional arms reduc-
tion will require major power initiative focusing on the specifics of
arms restraint and, very importantly, on a larger diplomatic effort
and leadership in increasing regional stability and reducing arms de-
mand. Presently the United States has a policy with the proper in-
gredients, but it is a stated policy with no implementation and is not
coupled in the broader context of a focused, diplomatic leadership
effort.
William George Wentz
324. See supra text accompanying note 311.
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